Welcome to Bob Thompson's hastily constructed page on the Iowa City
21 Ordinance
This page is a distillation of my research and thinking on the 21
ordinance, which will be on the ballot November 6. This ordinance would
raise the Iowa City bar entry age to 21; currently bars are allowed to
let persons 19 or older enter their establishments, so long as they are
not served alcohol.
First is my letter to the University of Iowa Faculty Senate of October
8. This presents background information, and a summary of relevant
research I've found. Below that is a piece deconstructing the Alcohol
Awareness Workgroup arguments for the ordinance. Below that is an
excerpt from an email to UI alcohol researcher Peter Nathan.
I am involved with a group opposing the ordinance, Bloc21.
Dear UI Faculty Senate/Council member:
It was reported that the Faculty Council granted an audience to
advocates of the 21 ordinance. Opponents'
request to the Senate for
equal time has thus far not been granted. I have done a great deal of
research on the issue, and as a clear picture emerged, it seemed
increasingly urgent to correct the viewpoint presented by advocates of
the ordinance; however, I have limited means of doing so. Since it has
not yet been decided whether the Senate will endorse the ordinance, and
"legitimate" avenues of expression are not open, I am resorting to this
email message to Faculty Council and Senate members. I make no apology
for this. With acquisition of vital knowledge that should inform
decisions made by others comes a responsibility to share that
knowledge. And as this knowledge is now passed on to you, so is the
responsibility to evaluate this decision carefully, as it will have a
dramatic impact on the future of the community.
I reviewed a large body of research literature that sheds light on the
potential impact the ordinance might have on students' alcohol
consumption, as well as its potential impact on the community.
Proponents of the ordinance have hardly given an objective
presentation; in order to correct any misperceptions that may have
resulted from this lopsided debate, I present a brief summary of
relevant research below, with citations linked to online sources.
First, it is necessary to provide background information on the history
of the community's efforts to curb alcohol abuse. Most people are not
aware of the larger context that provided the vehicle for this
ordinance to be placed on the ballot. That context needs to be
understood in order to make an informed decision on this important
issue.
When I began my review of research relevant to the ordinance, I also
began fact-checking statements by its advocates. The first thing I
discovered was that they fabricated
research statements, claiming the "facts according to research"
proved that the ordinance would reduce underage drinking. There is no
research on the efficacy of such an ordinance. The local effort to curb
binge drinking is not deploying tested strategies; on the contrary, it
is testing a new approach to the problem, involving a plethora of
policy and enforcement crackdowns. This is why advocates of the
ordinance are reduced to citing research pertaining to the harms
related to alcohol abuse, and the prevalence of "access and
availability" in our community: in the absence of known effective
strategies to mitigate student drinking, this program is intended to
test a particular approach by deploying it in college communities, and
studying the results. An objective look at the existing research
actually raises grave concerns that the ordinance will increase alcohol
abuse and related harms.
Whenever I try to explain that the local effort to curb alcohol abuse
has its origin and impetus in an ambitious "noble experiment" in social
engineering, I usually get a blank look in return; so I'll let
the architects of this experiment do the talking.
"AMOD (A Matter of Degree) was developed and funded by The
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF), and managed by the American
Medical Association (AMA). The program is funded through 2008." (CAS)
"The A Matter of Degree (AMOD) Advocacy Initiative was a two-year
project designed by (AMA) National Program Office (NPO) staff members
Lisa
Erk, Richard Yoast and Sandra Hoover, with the assistance of a national
technical resource group. The Advocacy Initiative's goal was to help
the ten campus-community partnerships of AMOD more effectively test the
environmental management model to prevent high-risk drinking among
college students. This model seeks to alter the physical, social and
economic environments that influence student drinking decisions through
policy and enforcement measures.
"...A key learning of this project is that a specific set of
professional skills is vital to the success of a coalition's effort to
change community policies and normative beliefs that create and
exacerbate the entrenched and complex problem of college binge
drinking. These skills include community organizing, media advocacy and
strategic planning, which are discussed in greater detail in this
report. The American Medical Association's (AMA) Office of Alcohol and
Other Drug Abuse, the national program office of AMOD, contracted with
Pan American Services (PAS) to provide this technical assistance and
training.
"...The AMA also contracted with Fenton Communications to create a
national media strategy, designed specifically to provide national
media coverage from which local media 'hooks' could be developed to
help drive policy change at the community level. Two major national
media campaigns garnered more than 1,000 combined print and broadcast
stories and catapulted the AMA into the headlines as a national leader
in the effort to reduce high-risk and underage drinking. As part of
these campaigns AMA chair J. Edward Hill, MD, was featured on the 'Good
Morning America' show declaring college binge drinking as a 'major
public health problem.' Most importantly, this media coverage helped
pave the way for dozens of local media stories in AMOD campus
communities." (AMOD
Advocacy Initiative)
Examples of AMOD
policy objectives:
- Keg registration.
- Child endangerment.
- Posting of warning signs where alcohol is sold.
- Restrictions on closing time.
- Restrictions on happy hours.
- Restrictions on low price sales.
- Restrictions on pitcher sales.
- Ban on home delivery of alcohol.
- Event licenses required.
- Billboard and sign controls.
- Restrictions on open assembly.
- Restrictions on alcohol use in certain areas (e.g., public
parks).
- Dry community (sales prohibited).
"From November 2000 through May 2001 PAS staff helped
identify media advocacy opportunities for
framing the issues of underage and binge drinking and the need for
policy solutions and worked with the project director to place related
media advocacy pieces." (UI
case study)
According to the UI case study, PAS provided the coalition with the
following:
Assistance in developing a strategic plan to support
policy objectives
Recommendation on strengthening project linkage to the community to
identify and increase support for policy objectives
Training and workshops on media advocacy, working within a political
system and spokesperson training
Identification of media opportunities and the drafting of media
materials such as op-eds and letters to the editor
Development of a strategic plan, talking points, spokesperson
preparation and other details in support of coalition participation in
state and local hearings
Fulfillment of requests to provide research to support policy passage
on the following topics: relationship between outlet density and crime,
zoning and alcohol outlets, economic impact of 21- plus service
restriction, and impact of price specials
Drafting of media materials such as op-eds and letters to the editor??!
This is mentioned three other times in the document:
"Julie Phye described the results of PAS's technical
assistance.
'They were great in helping us write opinion pieces for the
newspapers...'"
"Carolyn Cavitt said: '...Dennis Alexander (of PAS) ... helped the
coalition write opinion pieces and letters to the editor.'"
"The project developed a plan of action that included an op-ed and
letter to the editor focusing on downtown economics (written by PAS
staff)."
In other words, our local coalition received training in how to subvert
local politics to achieve its objectives, and received much outside
support for such, even an orchestrated "national media campaign." I
find it ironic that these educated, influential advocates couldn't even
write their own letters to the editor.
Research that conflicts with or undermines AMOD statements and
policy
The legal drinking age has no effect on alcohol consumption by
college
students (Wagenaar,
Toomey, 2002)
- "Of 24 college-specific analyses, 3 (13%) found a significant
inverse relationship between the legal age and alcohol consumption, 3
found a significant positive relationship, and 15 found no significant
relationship. One additional study found an inverse relationship with
no report on significance levels." In other words, it has made no
difference in consumption by college students, according to this
evaluation of all relevant research.
The most common source of obtaining alcohol by 18-20 year olds is a
legal-age peer (Wagenaar,
Toomey et al, 1996)
- "68% of those aged 18-20 obtained alcohol from a person age 21 or
older for their last drinking occasion... A commercial outlet was the
second most prevalent source for those aged 18-20 (14% obtained alcohol
directly from an outlet for their last drinking occasion)."
College students engage in substantially heavier drinking at
off-campus
parties, as opposed to bars (Harford,
Wechsler, Seibring,
2002)
- Data was obtained from a Harvard CAS survey of 12,830
college students. Underage consumption of
5+ drinks at parties was 49.3%, as opposed to 40.9% for bars. The study
concludes that "Because
they offer less access
to social controls from both
the campus and community, off-campus parties pose greater difficulties
related to successful intervention." An ISU
study of the same data
found the "high risk drinking" rate for underage drinkers was 47% at
parties, 31% for bars.
Economic theory predicts a substantial increase in alcohol
consumption when drinking occurs at private residences, rather than
bars (Cuellar,
2006)
- "One effect of reducing the number of drinking establishments
near a university campus is to push drinking among college students to
private residences. Using the standard neo-classical model of a utility
maximizing consumers, this paper explores the effect of pushing
drinking from drinking establishments to private residences on the
drinking habits of alcohol consumers... Assuming rational utility
maximizing behavior, alcohol consumption can be analyzed using a
standard consumer optimization model... The critical assumption here is
that at most drinking establishments, alcohol is sold on a per unit
basis. Facing a positive per unit price of alcohol (e.g., a 16 ounce
beer) consumers are forced to monitor alcohol consumption and are
constrained by the budget set... However, at a private residence, once
alcohol is purchased and brought to the residence, the cost of the
alcohol becomes a sunk cost and consumers are faced with zero per unit
marginal cost of consumption... consumers respond to the zero marginal
cost of consumption by increasing their consumption beyond what would
be consumed at a drinking establishment with a positive per unit
cost... consumers will consume alcohol until the marginal utility of
consumption is zero. Given the standard preference assumptions, forcing
alcohol consumption from drinking establishments to private residences
will result in a considerable increase in the level of alcohol
consumption for all but the heaviest drinkers." --It costs more to
drink in a bar, and drinking increases as per unit cost gets lower.
Ironically, Stepping Up et al used this principle when lobbying to
curtail drink specials, but completely forgot about it while advocating
the 21 ordinance.
- "Interestingly, while many
health organizations, such as the American Medical Association (AMA),
have identified the 21 minimum bar entry age as an effective way to
combat underage consumption, there is no scholarly research that
studies the potential effects of a 21 MBEA."
There is no research showing that increased enforcement, tougher
penalties and more restrictions reduce drinking among college students (National
Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism)
- Though the NIAAA is a Neo-Prohibitionist organization, it is not
explicitly dishonest, even if its carefully worded statements are
sometimes misleading if not properly understood. It admits that
strategies such as increased
enforcement of minimum legal drinking age laws and restrictions on
alcohol outlet density "have not yet been comprehensively evaluated
with college students." However, one of the studies cited in support of
increased enforcement of the drinking age (see above) showed that the
drinking age has no effect on consumption by college students.
The current stance among researchers that reducing "access and
availability" of alcohol reduces drinking by college students is an
untested hypothesis, based on correlation, not causation
- Weitzman et al observed a
correlation between the number of alcohol outlets surrounding a
campus, and consumption rates; however, they cautioned that
"Cross-sectional data like ours constrain us from making causal
inferences about the relationship between outlet density and drinking."
The current effort on AMOD sites (including UI) toward restricting
access is an experiment, to find a causal relationship in a
longitudinal study. To date, it has shown no success here, and little
or no success anywhere else. The best longitudinal study of the effect
of availability on consumption was conducted by Mulford
and Fitzgerald; they studied the effect of privatization of Iowa
wine sales. After a short uptick, levels of consumption returned to
their previous rate. An academic dispute ensued when more
temperance-oriented researchers attempted
to spin their data, but this attempt was soundly
refuted by Mulford and Fitzgerald.
A strong correlate exists between collegiate drinking rates and the
dominance of sports traditions (Nelson,
Wechsler, 2002)
- "A relationship was found between sports school status and high
rates of binge drinking...Half of the colleges with the highest rates
of binge drinking were sports schools (50%), compared to only one in
five of the moderate binge schools (18%) and low binge drinking schools
(19%)... Students attending sports schools experienced secondhand
effects of alcohol at higher rates than students at nonsports schools,
including having been assaulted, having property vandalized, having
their sleep or studying disrupted or experiencing an unwanted sexual
advance... it appears that high interest in sports may contribute to a
high level of binge drinking and a 'party atmosphere' on college
campuses." "Sperber
(2000) suggested that an institutional emphasis on athletics is
strongly associated with heavy alcohol consumption among its students.
In his book, Sperber used a variety of qualitative methods to develop a
compelling case linking declines in academic expectations of
undergraduate performance with increased emphasis on sports
entertainment and an increased effort by the alcohol industry to market
its product to college students, especially male sports fans."
Evidence suggests that the trend toward enforcement and
restrictions
aimed at reducing drinking by college students has led to an
increase in "celebratory disturbances" (riots) (ISU
VEISHEA riot task
force, 2004)
- "...(P)olicies that restrict alcohol may lead to rioting by (1)
driving drinking into large off-campus parties and (2) creating
encounters between partiers and police attempting to enforce alcohol
restrictions or respond to problems created by drinking. Buettner
(2004) suggests that the emergence and spread of the mixed-issue campus
disturbance may be connected to the raising of the drinking age in the
mid-1980s to comply with a federal mandate... The more restrictive
drinking rules resulted in movement of drinking to large, unregulated
off-campus parties and created the possibility of more frequent hostile
encounters with police...
"In addition to the federally-mandated drinking age, Iowa State
University students face a number of restrictions on alcohol
consumption, such as:
- An Ames City ordinance forbidding people below
the drinking age from entering local bars. This ordinance restricts the
ability of those who are underage to socialize with their friends who
may legally drink in bars; this restriction, in turn, drives people to
unregulated off-campus parties, where people of all ages may socialize
freely.
- Department of Residence rules limiting possession and
consumption of alcohol in residence halls. These residence hall
policies have grown stricter as the university has attempted to deal
with problems related to alcohol consumption."
Our local efforts at curbing underage "binge drinking" through
policy
and enforcement crackdowns have failed completely.
- The UI's Stepping Up Project and its sister coalitions in 9
other
AMOD communities coordinated the deployment of numerous anti-alcohol
policies and greatly enhanced enforcement. In the first
evaluation of
the program, "No statistically significant change was found in the
overall ten-school AMOD program for outcome measures of interest from
baseline (1997) to follow-up (2001)." Slight improvements in some
outcomes were noted in
half the communities, and this was used as a justification to continue
the experiment. After six years, students at the UI were actually
"binge drinking" more
than at the start of the experiment.
The Alcohol Awareness Work Group (AAWG) is distributing a flyer
entitled "Underage and Binge Drinking in Iowa City: Ten Troubling
Facts," to promote the 21 ordinance.
AAWG states that "Access to alcohol has increased significantly since
the early 1970s... In 1981, for example, there were 17 liquor licenses
and 10 downtown bars. In 2005, there were 48 liquor licenses and 32
bars in the same downtown Iowa City area... The number of downtown bars
has grown much faster than the Iowa City population."
This is the standard "access and availability"
mantra. In 1981, there was only one
liquor store in Iowa City; the State had a
monopoly on liquor sales. Ironically, the largest increase in downtown
bars occurred as a result of two of Stepping Up's
first victories in gaining alcohol restrictions: dry dorms and dry
Greek houses. In 1998, there were 20 downtown bars; in 1999, frats,
sororities and dorms went dry, which shifted much of the drinking to
the bars. The number of bars does not
tell us the total combined capacity of those establishments; in fact,
the trend has been toward smaller establishments. Bars with huge
capacities such as Granddaddy's and The Crow's Nest served many more
people than is the average now, and operated at full capacity not only
on weekends, but on many weeknights as well. Not to mention the
legendary frat parties, the famous Mayday Vonnegut-house party, etc.,
etc.. The number of licenses
tells us nothing about drinking rates.
AAWG states that "There is no local evidence that a 21-only ordinance
would generate more house party-related complaints. In fact complaints
stemming from house parties did not increase following introduction of
Iowa City's 19-year-old ordinance in 2003. Prior to 2003 there was no
age restriction for entry to bars. Since the passage of the 2003
Nuisance Property Ordinance, house party complaints have declined."
The careful wording of this statement is probably at the advice of the
only AAWG member with any expertise in alcohol research, Dr. Peter
Nathan; however, this careful wording also renders it irrelevant. There
is no "local" evidence because we've never had
a 21-only ordinance. This statement seems inconsistent with the Iowa
City Building Inspection Department's 2003
memo stating
that to accomodate "neighborhood code enforcement expectations" and
"enforcement of newly adopted ordinances" (the only one being the
nuisance rental property ordinance), it reduced its inspections of
certain
multi-family apartment units, compromising building safety for many
residents. Further, if the goal
is to reduce underage
drinking, the number of complaints is not relevant, nor is it an
indication of change in drinking rates; it may just as well be a result
of fewer complainants after the novelty of having the new ordinance
wore off, or could be an indication of reduced capacity for
enforcement. In one breath they claim that there was no increase in
party complaints as a result of the 19 ordinance, so why not make it
21; in the next, they cite the nuisance ordinance
(and keg registration) as a deterrent, in spite of
the documented shortage of City staff to deal with enforcement.
Since the intended objective of the 21-ordinance is to reduce underage
drinking, the question remains: Will it? The esteemed Dr. Nathan wasn't
so careful in his choice of words when he
was promoting the ordinance in 2005
:
he made the astonishing claim that "overall alcohol consumption by
underage students at the UI would drop by 25 to 30 percent." It's
difficult to imagine how he could pinpoint the effect of the ordinance
with such amazing accuracy, since, as the Illinois
HEC noted
(also in 2005), "...there is no scholarly
research that studies the potential effects of a 21 (minimum bar entry
age)." Nathan also claimed that "No data suggest that house parties
amount to more consumption than at bars." This is an interesting
statement as well, considering the intimate relationship between the
Harvard College Alcohol Study and the local temperance coalition with
which he is involved, via
the AMOD project. CAS
studied this question
in 2002, with data obtained from a survey of 12,830 students; how could
it have escaped Nathan's attention? A 2006 ISU
study of the CAS data found the rate of underage high risk drinking
of
47% at off-campus parties, as
opposed to just 31% for bars. The CAS
analysis shows the underage rate of
5+ drinks at parties is 49.3%, and 40.9% for bars.
Perhaps Dr. Nathan considers this data
irrelevant, when it conflicts with the political objective du jour. I respectfully
suggest that Dr. Nathan review the literature in his field of
expertise. In the same DI article, "Nathan
admitted an increase in house parties is inevitable if a 21-ordinance
were enacted." For once, Nathan is correct: Just as dry dorms and Greek
houses shifted the demand to bars, causing an increase in consumption
downtown, shifting the demand from bars will move the demand to the
only venue left for underage students to utilize. Therefore, an
increase in high-risk underage drinking is
inevitable as well, according to the important study he conveniently
forgot about.
AAWG states that "The University of Iowa ranks Number One among Big Ten
schools for binge drinking... High-risk drinking affects the health and
future of UI students... Underage UI student drinkers get into
trouble... Alcohol consumption interferes with learning."
While this is a regrettable situation, it tells us nothing
about the
efficacy of the 21 ordinance. In the context of the ordinance, this is
a vacuous appeal, something along the lines of "well, we have to do something, even if it's wrong."
Which is precisely the
approach that Stepping Up and its spinoff groups (including AAWG) have
advocated for the last ten years. The total lack of success of this
approach in reducing student drinking speaks for itself. Stepping Up et
al relentlessly advocated for increased enforcement efforts, even to
the extent of paying police out of
Stepping Up's budget, according to ICPD media releases. Their success
in bringing about increased
enforcement has resulted in no
decrease in alcohol consumption whatsoever, contrary to their
belief that "enforcement makes a difference." Makes a difference to
whom, and in what? To the community leaders, in demonstrating that they
are "making a
difference," or in reduction of drinking rates? As evidence for
their
assumption, they state that "Enforcement of the
minimum legal drinking age is the most frequently cited effective
strategy for decreasing the harmful effects of underage drinking."
"Most frequently cited" doesn't mean "effective." Let's make this clear
right now: Just because there's an increase in
arrest rates, doesn't mean there's a decrease in drinking; in fact,
Nathan's 2003 survey showed an increase in binge drinking after six
years
of deployment of these efforts. Enforcement is
the "most
frequently cited" strategy because of the national anti-alcohol
movement's
authoritarian obsession with punitive consequences as a deterrent,
which hasn't reduced underage drinking at all.
In the source
they cite the only specific "enforcement" shown to be effective
by any research is "compliance checks on retail alcohol outlets." In
fact, it is the only enforcement strategy mentioned in the entire
document, and is not listed
in the strategies known to be effective on college students; and it
does not say it reduced
underage drinking, only that it cut
sales to minors. There is
a difference; the most reliable suppliers for underage drinkers are
their legal-age friends, not "retail alcohol outlets." And let's not
forget about fake IDs.
AAWG states that "Residents of Iowa City pay the costs of
underage drinking while bars take in the profit. In 2006, 30 percent of
police incident reports included alcohol consumption. Downtown
vandalism and increased ambulance calls to downtown translate to slower
response time to emergencies in other areas of town."
Residents of Iowa City will pay the costs of excessive drinking no
matter where it occurs. Bloc21 has
made the case that it will
cause a
problem for neighborhoods if 17,800 underage students suddenly find
themselves
ostracized from downtown. We have also made the case that underage
drinking will increase as a result of this ordinance, thus resulting in
more vandalism and more ambulance calls, albeit not to downtown. We
also have gained much
support from emergency medical responders
themselves, who are telling us that the alcohol-related calls they deal
with at parties are more frequent and severe than they are
downtown.
A common method of misleading the public, and oneself, is to use
"facts," but to
inflate the importance of some facts while ignoring more relevant ones,
to construct a false image of the issue. We have made the case that
this is precisely what our local temperance advocates are doing here;
it has also been shown that they are not above inventing their "facts,"
as in the DI
piece proving that they fabricated research statements about a 21
bar entry age, when there is no research. Why their zeal has
compromised their integrity to this extent is unclear; but it has also been
proven that the community has been used as the subject of an
experiment in "environmental management" of alcohol restrictions for
the last ten years. That project consisted of forming a coalition of
influential people, and teaching them strategies to effectively subvert
local politics; perhaps these misinformation tactics are simply part of
their training.
If the ordinance passes, what's next? We have shown how it will disrupt
neighborhoods and increase alcohol consumption. The same people who now
insist that this ordinance will be effective will then be calling for
more punitive and restrictive measures to combat the problems that this
"solution" caused. What sort of "environmental management" will we be
contemplating next?
There's already a model program. "We wouldn't pull up to a burglary,
knock on the door, ask
them to come out, and just watch people jump through a window and run
away. Once we agree that a party is a crime scene, we know exactly how
to handle it." -Minnesota ZAP Team
officer
Meet the Zero Adult Providers (ZAP) squad. SWAT team takedowns of
beer parties. The massive
manpower needed to bust parties is astonishing. Undercover
investigations, obtaining warrants if necessary, surrounding and
securing the premises, lining up and screening potential suspects,
assembly-line
ticketing and arrest. While temperance advocates erroneously cite ISU's
lower binge drinking rate as evidence of success of the Ames 21 bar
entry age, they ignore the fact that 3 of the 4 VEISHEA riots were
sparked by police breaking up parties. In fact, riots are a
disturbing correlation with higher bar entry ages in college towns, and
an
unfortunate side effect of a 20 year trend toward restricting
student drinking. "Once we agree that a party is a crime scene,"
we'll know we've completely lost our minds.
Local temperance advocates have adopted the belief that any alcohol
restriction is a good alcohol restriction, and this is simply not the
case. This barrage of restrictions and
penalties has to end here, with the 21 ordinance campaign. The
anti-alcohol movement won't be happy until this is a dry community. In
fact, the AMOD program, which funded and directed our local temperance
coalition, listed
"dry community" and "restrictions on open assembly" among its policy
objectives. If the reader doesn't consider that a rather radical
agenda, my efforts at persuasion are wasted here.
-------------------------------------------------
appendix: excerpts from my email response to Dr. Nathan:
I had to look you up in the phone book to see where you live, after you
said that the students who attend house parties will be fewer than at
bars. You must not get within a half mile of downtown much, after dark.
There are hundreds of parties, all over the place. My initial fear was
that if the ordinance passes, those will increase in size and
debauchery. But since I heard that some enterpreneurs have gotten their
hands on some DOT license machines, I'm not so sure. Could be that
everyone will be 21, all of a sudden. Either way, it won't reduce
drinking.
I recently tagged along to the after-hours party scene in the student
ghettoes with some younger fans, just to remind myself what it was
like. People aren't at all discriminate as to who can come up and join
the party, it's all quite accessible, and people party-hop as much as
they bar-hop. Police are patrolling the party neighborhoods somewhat,
but on the first stop generally just give a warning. The smarter kids
quiet down or move it inside, only the dumber ones get busted. And yes,
the level of intoxication is much worse. The standard argument against
the ordinance really is true; the downtown is easily supervised, bars
have an interest in maintaining control in their establishments, and
there is an element of social restraint and relative safety that you
don't see in the ghetto parties. Assuming the ordinance does shift some
of the downtown drinking to parties, it will only move it further out
of sight, to a place where "binge drinking" becomes "extreme drinking."
...
What I've noticed in this town is an extreme social disconnect at work,
particularly with the alcohol issue. I think much of the larger
cultural problem is that there's little mingling of students with older
folks. And I've also noticed, in drinking settings, that young people
turn it down a couple of notches when they are around older people.
There's a noticeable behavioral shift when a table full of grannies
sits down in the middle of the party. I've often thought that if people
really wanted to affect student drinking and associated behavior,
they'd get involved in students' lives, on the students' turf, rather
than trying to take the students' turf away from them. There's an
underlying authoritarian assumption at work with this faith in
restrictive and punitive measures, along with lack of understanding and
indifference about what students' lives are really like. That's why the
attitude behind the community's current approach to the alcohol problem
is fatally flawed, and doomed to fail.
I have no problem with anyone pointing out the adverse effects of
alcohol abuse, but in the effort to do so, the role that government can
realistically assume has been distorted beyond its capacity, even its
obligation, to protect from harm. It's hardly a benevolent solution to
use the force of government to discourage behavior that is the norm,
and that's what the "environmental approach," insofar as it's been
promoted and applied here, is trying to do; it's confused "harm" with
"alcohol." You've essentially declared war on us, and that is precisely
what it is, a political turf war. And the turf in question, which
advocates of the ordinance have little regard for, is the primary
social setting of a huge segment of the community, without any viable
plan for its replacement. Looks like there won't be a truce until at
least Nov. 7. I haven't a clue whether the ordinance will pass. If it
does, I assume the crackdown approach will continue. If it doesn't, the
community might actually have an opportunity for a realistic discussion
of possible strategies. But I'm not gonna get my hopes up.
-BT